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et al.: Pleading--Attorney Negotiations Do Not Constitute An Appearance

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

In the instant case, the court simply defined more distinctly

the county court's powers in selecting its own election officials
once it decided those lists submitted were invalid, i.e., that the

county court can legitimize an invalid group by adopting it as the
county court's choice for election officials.
Pleading-Attorney Negotiations
Do Not Constitute An Appearance
Plaintiff contracted to renovate defendant's house, and after
partial completion of the contract a dispute arose between the parties. Both parties employed attorneys who engaged in unsuccessful
negotiations. Plaintiff then instituted suit and defendant failed to
answer within the twenty days required by Rule 12 (a) of the West
Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff's attorney orally agreed
with the defendant's attorney to an extension of time. However,
once this time extension had expired, the plaintiff moved for and
received a default judgment. The defendant contended the trial
court erred in refusing to set aside the judgment. Held, affirmed.
Intercity Realty Co. v. Gibson, 175 S.E.2d 452 (W. Va. 1970). Because the defendant's and plaintiff's attorneys had been negotiating, the defendant contended these negotiations constituted an
appearance entitling her to three days written notice in accordance
with rule 55 (b), West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Supreme Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's finding that
these negotiations did not constitute an appearance. The court distinguished Dalminter, Inc. v. Jessie Edwards, Inc. 27 F.R.D. 491
(S.D. TFX. 1961), in which a layman's timely written answer mailed directly to the plaintiff's attorney was held to constitute an appearance.
The defendant also contended the judgment should have
been set aside for "excusable neglect" or "any other reason, justifyinf relief from the operation of the judgment" under rule 60 (b)
(1), (6), West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. In refusing to
set aside the default judgment under rule 60 (b), the court held
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the
defendant failed to show cause for his failure to answer timely.
Perhaps the significance of this case is found in the concurring
opinion of Judge Berry. His opinion warned attorneys to adhere
strictly to the Rules of Civil Procedure. Noting that time extentions
are secured through compliance with rule 6 (b), West Virginia
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Rules of Civil Procedure, his opinion stated attorneys cannot, by

their own agreement, attempt to circumvent the application of the
Rules.
Statutes-Modern Budget
Amendment-Item Veto
During its 1970 regular session the West Virginia legislature
passed a bill establishing the state budget for fiscal year 1970-71.
The bill was presented to Governor Arch A. Moore, Jr., for his approval. On the face of the bill the governor reduced the appropriations for certain accounts by drawing a line through the amounts
provided and inserting lower amounts. He then added his initials"A.A.M., Jr." There were no other notations on the bill and the
interlinations made by the governor were the only indications
that changes had been made. The bill was then filed in the office
of the Secretary of State.
The attorney general, Chauncey H. Browning, Jr., instituted
an original proceeding in mandamus to require C. A. Blankenship,
clerk of the House of Delegates, to publish the budget bill as passed by the legislature, excluding the reductions made by the governor. The attorney general contended that the reductions made by
the governor did not comply with the manatory procedure for
vetoes set forth in the modern budget amendment to the West Virginia Constitution W. VA. CONsT. art. VI, § 51. Held, writ granted.
The act of the governor in crossing out the items on the bill indicated that he disapproved of them in their original form, but mere
disapproval does not constitute an objection that would satisfy the
requirements of the modem budget amendment. In order to comply with the amendment, reasons must be given for the exercise of
an item veto. State ex rel. Browning v. Blankenship, 175 S.E.2d
172 (W. Va. 1970).
The govenor contended that his actions in amending the budget bill did substantially, though not literally, comply with the provisions of the modem budget amendment. In support of his position the govenor cited three West Virginia cases which held that
substantial compliance with a constitutional provision requiring
publication of proposed constitutional amendments was sufficient.
May v. Topping, 65 W. Va. 656, 64 S.E. 848 (1909); Capita v.
Topping, 65 W. VA. 587, 64 S.E. 845 (1909). The court distinguished those cases from the factual situation existing in State ex rel.
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